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Personality
Two ways of thinking about it
HANS Eysenck was one of the first people to combine whatCronbach (1957) called the two
disciplines of scientific psychology – the
correlational and the experimental. In this
article I’ll describe my own correlational
and experimental research into the role of
confirmatory processing in personality
questionnaire responding, and how
cognitive styles such as dogmatism
influence confirmatory processing. I aim 
to show why I believe Eysenck was right 
– the two disciplines need to be unified
before psychology becomes a truly
scientific paradigm.
A troubled marriage
When Hans Eysenck did his seminal work
on personality (Eysenck, 1947), there was 
a clear separation between Cyril Burt’s
London School and Frederick Bartlett’s
Cambridge School. The London School
was interested in individual differences,
factor analysis and psychometrics, whereas
the Cambridge School was interested in
rather narrow experimental designs. When
Eysenck suggested that the two sides
should work together to produce a unified
science, both apparently turned hostile.
Although some early personality
theorists had engaged in experimental work,
Eysenck was really the first to carry out
systematic and programmatic experimental
studies of personality. These were guided
by his theoretical framework for personality
(see Figure 1). This framework led to
testable predictions, and Eysenck felt that
experimental work was the obvious way to
validate his particular theoretical system.
He did not feel that factor analysis alone
could decide between different personality
theories in any definitive fashion; a feeling
supported by the existence of a number of
different systems, proposing between three
and 16 major dimensions of personality
(Eysenck, 1991). In his view, proximal
consequences  were the most important
aspect of any theory of personality. If
predictions about proximal consequences
were verified, this would constitute solid
evidence for the theory – evidence of a
kind not available to any purely taxonomic
theory based simply on factor analysis.
In his remarks on this subject in the
introduction to the Transaction edition
(1998) of Dimensions of Personality,
Eysenck concluded:
The inevitable marriage between
experimental psychology and
correlational psychology is as far away
as ever. Experimental psychologists
simply do not read personality journals,
and consequently do not realize how
inclusion of individual differences could
rescue so much of their work from
drowning in the error term. Personality
psychologists still wallow in
psychometric puddles like the ‘Big Five’
swamp, and do not see that they must
consider wider horizons. (p.xv)
This is perhaps an overly pessimistic view.
Given the scope of the many books,
chapters and articles he wrote, I think that
Eysenck’s work has been and continues to
be a major inspiration to the many people
who wish to see a synthesis of the
experimental and the correlational in
psychological research. This is the aspect
of Eysenck’s work that I would like to
acknowledge.
Confirmatory bias in
personality processing
As an example of my application of both
correlational and experimental approaches
in personality research, I would like to
describe the role of confirmatory
processing in personality questionnaire
responding. One phenomenon of particular
interest to me is the tendency for people to
accept bogus but plausible descriptions of
their personality. An early finding in this
area has come to be known as the Barnum
effect. When people are presented with
ostensible personality feedback consisting
of vague and generalised statements (e.g.
‘You have a great need for other people to
In his Hans Eysenck Lecture, MARTIN DAVIES describes
how he has continued to integrate the correlational and
experimental in the study of personality and cognition.
If asked whether we are extravert, we tend to think of parties rather than quiet nights in
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like and admire you’), they readily accept
such statements as accurate and personally
revealing descriptions of the self (for a
review see Dickson & Kelly, 1985).
A number of reasons have been
proposed for this acceptance of generalised
personality interpretations. One argument
is that Barnum statements are universally
applicable, so the descriptions are accepted
because they are in fact true of most people
most of the time. However, this explanation
does not account for why Barnum
statements are judged to be much more
true for the self than for other people – 
that is, they seem to be uniquely self-
descriptive. One possibility is that the
Barnum effect may reflect a failure to 
take account of the greater availability of
knowledge about the self compared with
knowledge about others. People have a
much larger memory store of information
about themselves than about any other
person, so they are able to find more
behavioural evidence from their past
history that confirms common traits in
themselves. 
Confirmatory bias is the tendency to
seek out information that is consistent 
with a belief or hypothesis and to avoid 
or ignore information that is potentially
inconsistent (see Nickerson, 1998). An
important element in confirmatory bias is
the use of a positive test strategy (Klayman
& Ha, 1987). Such a strategy involves
testing a hypothesis by looking for
examples where the hypothesised property
is known or expected to be present rather
than absent. For example, in testing the
hypothesis that a person is an extravert,
a questioner will ask questions such as 
‘Do you like parties?’ that, if answered
affirmatively, would confirm the
hypothesis; rather than questions such as
‘Do you like to be on your own?’ that, if
answered affirmatively, would disconfirm
the hypothesis. This positive test strategy
leads to confirmatory bias if evidence
consistent with the hypothesis is obtained. 
In the case of judgements about the self,
we possess complex and detailed
knowledge of our past history that is
diverse and often contradictory. For many
aspects of the self, people should be able 
to find evidence that confirms any given
hypothesis through the use of a positive test
strategy. If you ask yourself the question
‘Do I like parties?’, you will tend to think
of occasions when you went out to parties
rather than occasions when you stayed in
for a quiet night in front of the TV or
reading a book. The more examples of
going to parties you think of, the more 
you will think of yourself as extravert.
So how have I assessed this
phenomenon?
Correlational studies I examined the
cognitions that people generated when they
evaluated bogus personality descriptions
(Davies, 1997). I found that they generated
significantly more thoughts consistent with
the personality descriptions than thoughts
inconsistent with the descriptions (e.g. in
evaluating the statement ‘Security is one 
of your major goals in life’, they tended 
to think of examples from their past when
they had acted in a safe, responsible way
rather than in a rash, impulsive way). 
That is, they showed confirmatory bias.
Moreover, their ratings of the accuracy of
the personality descriptions were
significantly correlated with the availability
of confirming evidence, as measured by the
relative numbers of consistent and
inconsistent thoughts generated.
However, this research only provided
indirect evidence (via correlational and
covariance analyses) for the causal role of
confirmatory bias, because confirmatory
and disconfirmatory processing were not
experimentally manipulated. 
Experimental studies Next, I
investigated people’s evaluation of
personality information after they had been
induced to generate either confirmatory
cognitions, disconfirmatory cognitions or
both (Davies, 2003). They were presented
with personality statements such as ‘You
have a great need for other people to like
and admire you’. Some participants were
asked to write down only examples from
their past behaviour that were consistent
with the statements (e.g. trying to please 
or impress someone), whereas others were
asked only for inconsistent examples. The
results showed that generating only
disconfirmatory thoughts led to
significantly lower accuracy ratings for the
personality descriptions than generating
both types of thought or no thoughts,
whereas generating only confirmatory
thoughts led to significantly higher
accuracy ratings than generating both types
of thought or no thoughts. 
Implications Apart from shedding light
on processes involved in the acceptance of
personality statements, these studies also
suggest how the evaluation of such
statements might alter one’s self-
conceptions. People do not realise that they
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FIGURE 1 Eysenck’s view of personality (P = Psychoticism, E = Extraversion, N = Neuroticism)
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are testing hypotheses in a biased manner
when they use a positive test strategy
(Kunda et al., 1993). They may therefore
conclude that the evidence retrieved about
themselves reflects a true picture of the
self. It is easy to see how one’s current
self-concept can be influenced by such
evidence-gathering strategies. A great deal
of research has testified to the stability of
the self-concept in adults (Markus &
Kunda, 1986). However, along with other
work (e.g. Kunda et al., 1993), my research
shows that there is some malleability in the
self-concept. I think the circumstances
under which self-concept change occurs 
is a vitally important one for personality
psychologists to understand.
Cognitive styles
Eysenck had interests in both personality
and intelligence, although he did much less
empirical work on the latter. One construct
that bridges the gap between personality
and intelligence (or cognitive abilities) is
cognitive style. Cognitive styles are
people’s characteristic and typically
preferred modes of processing information
(Sternberg & Grigorenko, 1997): how a
person typically does think, rather than
how well they can think. 
One cognitive style that should have
clear implications for cognitive processing
is dogmatism. Central to Rokeach’s (1954)
analysis of dogmatism is that an
individual’s cognitive system is organised
into belief–disbelief systems. This
structural aspect of dogmatism is
characterised by the relatively closed
cognitive organisation of beliefs and
disbeliefs about reality. The closed nature
of the belief systems of high-dogmatic
individuals is observed in their tendency to
compartmentalise and isolate their beliefs
and disbeliefs, whereas the more open
belief systems of low-dogmatic individuals
is observed in their readiness to make
connections between disparate beliefs. 
For example, people high in dogmatism
endorse statements such as ‘Of all the
different philosophies which exist in the
world, there is only one which is correct’.
Perhaps because of an early emphasis
on the cognitive structures associated with
dogmatism, little research has been carried
out on the underlying cognitive processes
involved in dogmatic judgement and
decision making. The investigation of
confirmatory processing as a function of
dogmatism seemed like a good opportunity
to investigate cognitive processes as a
function of cognitive style.
Initially, I examined dogmatism in a
belief persistence paradigm (Davies, 1993).
This particular paradigm – known as
‘belief persistence after evidential
discrediting’ – involves establishing an
erroneous belief and then demonstrating
that the belief was based on flimsy, false or
nonexistent evidence (Ross et al., 1975). In
these circumstances, people persist with
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‘studies of individual
differences can add much to
our understanding of
cognitive processes’
their erroneous belief because they 
recruit additional evidence from their self-
knowledge that bolsters the original belief
and that is left intact even when the
original evidential base is removed. In
other words, confirmatory processing leads
to belief persistence. For example, suppose
you are (falsely) told that you have done
much better than average in a test of
spotting fake and genuine suicide notes. 
To explain this unexpected skill you will
probably reflect on your abilities in related
areas – perhaps being a good listener and
the ability to empathise. When you
discover that the test result was rigged, you
nevertheless persist in your belief in your
new-found ability, because the confirming
beliefs in yourself as a good listener and
empathiser are left intact.
I found that belief persistence was much
greater for those high than for those low in
dogmatism, as measured by Rokeach’s
Dogmatism Scale. In addition, those high
in dogmatism generated more supporting
evidence and much less contradictory
evidence than did those low in dogmatism.
Through covariance analysis I found that
differential evidence generation accounted
for some of the belief persistence effect
and for most of the difference in belief
persistence as a function of dogmatism. 
In further studies of belief formation,
I again found evidence for an association
between dogmatism and confirmatory bias
(Davies, 1998). However, there was an
asymmetry in the findings such that the
difference between high and low dogmatics
lay mainly in the generation of
disconfirming rather than confirming
evidence. From an analysis of the evidence
generated, it seemed to me that high
dogmatics were inhibited in their
generation of contradictory evidence by 
the prior generation of supporting evidence.
I found that high dogmatics were much
more likely to produce supporting evidence
before contradictory evidence. 
In the literature on judgement and
decision making, there is a phenomenon
called output interference: generating 
a given reason for a decision or judgement
inhibits the generation of other reasons
(e.g. Hoch, 1984). In particular, generating
a supporting reason interferes with the
ability to generate a contradictory reason,
and vice versa. By experimentally
manipulating the order in which people
generated supporting and contradictory
reasons, I found not only that high
dogmatics were more prone to output
interference in the generation of reasons
but also that this differential reason
generation produced (and indeed accounted
for) significant differences in beliefs as a
function of dogmatism.
This research on dogmatism again
illustrates the benefits of amalgamating
correlational and experimental methods.
Research in mainstream social cognition
has led to a detailed understanding of how
most people typically process information
about everyday social events. However,
relatively little research has been carried
out on individual differences in such social
information processing. Yet studies of
individual differences can add much to our
understanding of cognitive processes. Such
studies can provide a valuable test of
normative theories by investigating the
effects of naturally occurring variations 
in postulated mediating processes.
The present research underscores 
this point and emphasises the utility of
combining different theoretical approaches
– one involving a general process
(confirmatory bias), the other an
individual-difference variable (dogmatism)
– to generate new findings that would not
be produced using either approach alone. 
Thus, dogmatic individuals adopt more
extreme attitudes and beliefs because they
generate fewer contradictory reasons due to
greater output interference, and differential
reason generation produces greater primacy
effects in the judgements of dogmatic people
because they tend to compartmentalise
their beliefs and disbeliefs.
Conclusion
I would like to conclude with a quote 
from one of Hans Eysenck’s last papers
(Eysenck, 1997), which I think encapsulates
one of his most important legacies:
Bright and dull, extraverted and
introverted, neurotic and stable – the
personality of the participants will
(nearly) always interfere with the actions
of [experimental] independent variables.
This makes experimentation much more
complex and difficult, requiring
experimentalists to acquaint themselves
with the theories and findings of
personality researchers. But there is no
alternative. Scientists cannot disregard
factors that can be demonstrated to affect
their experiments. Conversely, the
inclusion of such factors will inevitably
throw new light on the personality
theories in question. And what is more,
researchers shall achieve the aim of
having a unified psychology and shall
possess a truly scientific paradigm.
(p.1230)
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